Iran's Nuclear Fatwa: Between Doctrine and Deterrence
Author: Anonymous
Pascal Lottaz
Pascal’s Substack
The role of Ayatollah Khamenei's Fatwa against nuclear weapons is an open question that merits attention. In an anonymous letter, an Iranian colleague analyses the situation.
The question of whether Ayatollah Khamenei’s stance on nuclear weapons constitutes a formal fatwa (Islamic legal ruling) or merely a political statement has long been debated. Officially, the Iranian government—including the Supreme Leader’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—refers to this position as a fatwa prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons. This claim has also been presented in communications with international bodies such as the IAEA. In public speeches, Khamenei has stated: “We do not seek nuclear weapons, because we consider them forbidden—haram.”
Yet the supposed nuclear fatwa is absent from his formal compendia of legal opinions online. It exists primarily in speeches and official statements. Critics contend that without a documented legal opinion grounded in Islamic jurisprudence, this position operates more as a political or moral pronouncement than a juridical fatwa.
That said, in Shi’a legal tradition, a fatwa need not appear in book form to be valid—any public statement by a qualified authority declaring a normative judgment can be considered a fatwa. Thus, the status of Khamenei’s declaration depends on interpretive framing: to the Islamic Republic, it is a binding ruling; to skeptics, it remains a strategic assertion with limited doctrinal weight.
From my perspective as an observer, I do not believe there is any definitive religious barrier to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. In Shi’a jurisprudence, the doctrine of secondary rulings (ahkam thanawiyya) allows a jurist to issue a new ruling under special conditions—such as duress, existential threat, or necessity—even if it appears to contradict the primary ruling (hukm awwali). This doesn’t mean the original norm is invalid; it simply becomes dormant while the secondary ruling takes precedence under new conditions.
To support this assessment, I examined a series of documents, including the full list of Khamenei’s fatwas online from the same year in which the nuclear prohibition was allegedly issued. That list includes several clearly juridical fatwas—with structured argumentation, references to hadith, and formal rhetoric—but no mention of nuclear weapons.(1) The purported nuclear fatwa itself (2), when examined, reads more like a policy statement: brief, abstract, and lacking the textual form of traditional Shi’a jurisprudence. It appears stylistically anomalous.
Further support for this interpretation comes from remarks by senior figures within the government. In April 2025, Ali Larijani—a top adviser to the Supreme Leader and long-serving conservative powerbroker—publicly stated that the nuclear fatwa should be understood as a "secondary ruling" (hukm thanawī)(3) and is therefore subject to change.(4) He added that if the United States or Israel were to attack Iran, the Islamic Republic would be forced to pursue nuclear weaponization. This is not the first time high-level Iranian officials have made similar remarks. Kamal Kharrazi, another adviser to the Supreme Leader, made a comparable statement in late 2024, emphasizing that Iran’s nuclear doctrine is conditional and could change if government survival were threatened.
To understand this logic, one must revisit Ayatollah Khomeini’s foundational doctrine of wilāyat-e mutlaqa (absolute guardianship of the jurist). In a speech delivered on March 21, 1983, Khomeini declared that preserving the Islamic Republic is more important than any other obligation—even prayer, fasting, or the life of the Hidden Imam. He made clear that existential threats justify the suspension of otherwise binding norms. His famous phrase—“If anyone attacks us, we will smash their mouth”—captures the theological realism at work. Khamenei, as his disciple and successor, inherited this framework. In such a system, even if the anti-nuclear fatwa is taken at face value, it can be overridden by a secondary ruling issued in response to shifting geopolitical conditions.
This is not mere speculation. Iran’s strategic posture over the past two decades suggests a calculated ambiguity. Despite regional power and demonstrated military capability, Iran has never crossed the nuclear threshold. Why? Likely for several reasons.
First, the Islamic Republic is not monolithic. It is a system made up of multiple centers of power—clerics, military leaders, technocrats, and economic elites. While the Supreme Leader has the final say, he also plays the role of mediator among these factions. To avoid destabilizing internal balances, nuclear weaponization would need broad consensus among these groups and their respective bases.
Second, Iran knows its limits. While capable of fierce retaliation, it is unlikely to win a direct confrontation against two nuclear powers (the U.S. and Israel). It therefore favors a calibrated strategy: demonstrate strength without overstepping into full escalation.
Third, economic realism matters. Going overtly nuclear would destroy any prospect of easing international sanctions. Unlike North Korea, Iran does not seek total isolation. It aims to remain in the global system, even if on contested terms. Iranians and their government are not isolationists. There are around 7 million Iranians living outside of Iran and many of them visit their country every year. In addition, Iranians are highly connected to the outside world via satellites, the internet, etc.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic has invested heavily in projecting influence through symbolic and ideological capital. Unable to confront two nuclear powers militarily, the government has focused on another layer: soft power. By framing its nuclear restraint as a moral stance—grounded in religious principle and the historical trauma of chemical warfare—Iran has constructed an ethical position that resonates globally. This strategy has gained unexpected traction even among Western analysts, many of whom are critical of militarism and sympathetic to non-proliferation. Moreover, during the U.S.–Israel offensive of June 2025, Iran notably played by the book: it appealed to international law, avoided indiscriminate retaliation, and sought to demonstrate legal and diplomatic discipline. On this terrain—Iran’s deliberate adherence to moral framing and legal posture—it has arguably outmaneuvered its nuclear-armed adversaries, shifting the battleground toward legitimacy rather than raw force.
Still, a reasonable question arises: If survival of the government is indeed the overriding principle, then why hasn’t Iran simply built the bomb? Wouldn’t that be the ultimate insurance against regime change or foreign aggression? The honest answer is that we don’t know exactly what the Iranian government is doing. What we do know is that for years it has pursued a threshold-state strategy—neither fully nuclear nor fully non-nuclear—and that this posture has served it well. The Islamic Republic has survived since 1979 through wars, sanctions, uprisings, and isolation. That endurance suggests that ambiguity, not absolutism, has been the cornerstone of its nuclear logic. However, in the wake of direct military attacks and rising existential threats, the calculus may be shifting. It is entirely possible that some within the system now believe that moving toward actual weaponization is not only permissible, but necessary—justified by the very same realist-theological reasoning first articulated by Khomeini in the 1980s: when the government’s survival is at stake, even the most sacred prohibitions may be set aside.
So yes—the fatwa exists, but it is elastic. The doctrine is real, but conditional. And the system speaks in layers, not absolutes. Or as one might put it: Hay muchos caminos para llegar a Dios.
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Sources
1. Fatwas, Khamenei's official site
3. Shi'a Encyclopedia: احکام ثانویه - ویکی شیعه
4. News Report, Ali Larijani (Farsi)