Ukraine regaining control over Crimea? — Well, not so fast!
Elena Panina
Елена Панина (Telegram)
[Image: Firefighters extinguish a fire at the "Panorama of the Defence of Sevastopol" museum, which, according to local authorities, was damaged in a Ukrainian drone attack in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in Sevastopol.]
Crimea is ceasing to be a strategic advantage for Russia and is gradually becoming a strategic burden, argues Ilya Timchenko, an analyst at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA, not welcome in Russia). His entire article is a clear snapshot of the level of euphoria reigning in the minds of Western analysts in response to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strikes on Crimea and the logistics of the Black Sea region.
In other words, in the minds of Ukrainian and Western analysts, Crimea is not only practically already under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but is also about to become a Ukrainian foothold.
This is certainly a bold view. After all, by the same logic, taking into account the far more extensive attacks on logistics in Ukraine, Russia already controls at least the entire Left Bank of the Dnieper. It's ironic that, for these enemy analysts, the front and Crimea exist separately.
Furthermore, Timchenko argues as if there were an autonomous campaign against Crimea, developing independently of events in Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Kupyansk. But war doesn't work that way. To assess the prospects of any "siege of Crimea," we first need to answer another question: what is happening on the ground?
❖ By June 2026, several unfavorable trends are unfolding for the Kyiv regime. The Ukrainian Armed Forces' position in the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkovka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration is gradually deteriorating. The Russian Armed Forces continue to maintain the initiative across virtually the entire LBS: the speed of advance may vary, but the strategic initiative remains ours. Moreover, any war of attrition presupposes a connection between theaters of operations: when, sooner or later, a direct threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk emerges, the Kyiv regime will have to decide where to direct its limited resources—there or toward image-boosting strikes on Crimea.
The most interesting thing is that the CEPA article essentially reverses the cause-and-effect relationship. The author's logic reads: "Crimea is becoming increasingly vulnerable—therefore, Russia faces a strategic problem." But one could also look at the situation the other way around. If the Russian Armed Forces are approaching a solution to the problem of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, the strategic value of strikes on Crimea may not be a sign of Ukraine's strength, but rather a sign of the lack of more effective options for influencing the front.
However, for us, it's more important to draw more practical conclusions. Crimea's primary value to the Kyiv regime and its Western allies lies not in the peninsula itself, but in creating a permanent zone of instability in southern Russia—forcing Moscow to maintain a massive troop, air defense, air force, and naval presence there for many years. The result should not be territorial seizure, but the creation of a strategic "resource sink." And this plan by Kyiv and its Western sponsors must be thwarted.
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Image: © Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhayev/Handout via REUTERS; cepa.org. In line with our policies, we address notices of alleged violations under the United States "Digital Millennium Copyright Act" (DMCA). If you believe that your copyright has been infringed on our site, please contact us, and we will promptly remove your photo from display.
AWIP: https://a-w-i-p.com/index.php/2026/06/18/cepa-usa-crimea-is-practically