Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

[Speech slightly edited for clarity by this editor.]

The following is my speech at a conference organised by General Michael Flynn at the Gold Institute in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska.

My talk will focus to a large extent on Russia, as it has played a central role in shaping the purpose of transatlantic security over the past 80 years. Furthermore, Russia is a key actor in the multipolar world, an independent pole of power, and China's most important strategic partner. The China-Russia strategic partnership is referred to as Kissinger’s worst nightmare, as his key achievement was to keep these two Eurasian giants apart.

Trump recently met with Xi in Beijing, and shortly thereafter, Putin arrived there as well. The two Eurasian leaders agreed upon a common statement on commitment to a multipolar world. Three years earlier, in March 2023, Xi had told Putin that the world is now undergoing changes not seen for 100 years.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Russia prioritised integration with the West to construct an inclusive Europe – a Greater Europe. With this overarching objective, relations with China and Iran were often ignored and even used as a bargaining chip for Russia to negotiate a place in the West. This is no longer the case; Russia now looks to the East, and countries such as China, Iran, and India are key strategic partners in an effort to reduce dependence on the West and construct a multipolar world order.

Finian Cunningham
strategic-culture.su

Russia’s hand is being forced to hit the new front to restore deterrence and avoid a total escalation.

The shooting down of a Ukrainian drone by a NATO warplane over Estonia this week shows how close the proxy war with Russia is to a European-wide escalation.

NATO and the EU leadership are pushing the Baltic states to escalate the war with Russia. Maybe it’s time for Moscow to preempt as the best way to avoid all-out war.

It was the first reported case of a NATO fighter jet intercepting a Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Estonia’s Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur announced: “We decided that we needed to take it down… it was meant to hit Russian targets.”

His remarks betray a nervousness among the Baltic states about where their support for Ukraine is leading them after Russia warned that it is ready to deliver on threats of retaliation for allowing Ukraine to use their airspace to launch strikes. Effectively, they are forming a new front against Russia, with echoes of Operation Barbarossa when the Nazi Third Reich attacked Russia in a pincer through these same states in 1941. However, in the current situation, they are not sure about the consequences. Russia might have to relieve them of their doubts anyway before it’s too late.

Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

The trajectory now appears increasingly clear: NATO will continue to disintegrate, and the Europeans will compensate by further escalating the war against Russia.

NATO was always destined to be a temporary military alliance, united by a common enemy and threat during the Cold War. Once that threat disappeared with the end of the Cold War and, thereafter, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main question in the 1990s was: What would be NATO’s new raison d'être? The answer to this question was to pursue unipolarity / collective hegemony in the post-Cold War era through NATO expansionism and military interventionism (“out of area or out of business”).

Russia was implicitly given the ultimatum: be a compliant civilizational student or a counter-civilizational force. Russia could accept NATO's hegemonic role as a “force for good,” or it could resist, in which case NATO would return to its former role of confronting Russia. The NATO-backed regime change in Ukraine—aimed at transforming the country from a Russian partner into a frontline state aligned against Russia— triggered the war in 2014. NATO thus began reverting to its former role of confronting Russia, even as the hegemonic era had come to an end.

Now that the former collective hegemony has given way to a multipolar world, NATO has once again lost its purpose and will disintegrate. European leaders want to restore NATO’s original purpose: containing Russia. This will fail because it is based on the fraudulent narrative that Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union, rather than balancing NATO expansionism and military interventionism.

Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

Why are Norwegian political elites so overrepresented in the Epstein files? Several news outlets around the world have reported on the shock to the small Scandinavian country, which consistently demonstrates high public trust in the government. How could this have happened?

The source of the problem is a de-nationalised political elite decoupling itself from the public. The Norwegian government has an explicit ambition to become an international humanitarian superpower by spending billions on aid. The small country’s obsession with punching above its weight in international humanitarianism could be applauded. However, if one scratches the surface, it is not as benign as one would hope.

A small but wealthy country can easily give rise to an elite class with ambitions beyond national borders, and even fuel delusions that they can save the world. With enough resources, these elites form a permanent bureaucracy, develop international elite networks, and in the process earn some money for themselves. Whereas monarchs of the past had a mandate from God, the new nobility claims a mandate from humanitarianism and globalism. Immunity develops because when policies are defined by virtue, opposition is deemed heretical and illegitimate. Herein lies the problem of international humanitarianism: the assumed virtue limits criticism, transparency, and accountability.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
President of Russia (en.kremlin.ru)

Vladimir Putin took part in the plenary session of the 22nd annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.

Research Director of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai International Discussion Club Fyodor Lukyanov: Ladies and gentlemen, guests of the Valdai Club!

We are beginning the plenary session of the 22nd annual forum of the Valdai International Discussion Club. It is a great honour for me to invite President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to this stage.

Mr President, thank you very much for once again finding time to join us. The Valdai Club enjoys this great privilege of meeting with you for 23 consecutive years to discuss the most topical issues. I believe that no one else is that lucky.

The 22nd meeting of the Valdai Club, which took place over the past three days, was titled “The Polycentric World: Instructions for Use.” We are attempting to move from merely understanding and describing this new world to practical matters: that is, comprehending how to live in it, since it is not yet entirely clear.

We may consider ourselves advanced users, but we are still only users of this world. You, however, are at least a mechanic and perhaps even an engineer of this very polycentric world order, so we eagerly await some guidelines for use from you.

Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

This international system based on international anarchy originated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which laid the foundation for the modern world order. The hegemonic system had broken down, and after 30 years of war, it became evident that there would be no peace through victory by a new hegemon. The Thirty-Year War thus ended with the Peace of Westphalia, which was based on the recognition that peace would depend on a balance of power between sovereign states. Security in the Westphalian system therefore entails mitigating security competition by attempting to establish formats for indivisible security. The Westphalian peace is often blamed for the international anarchy, yet this is not the crisis of our time.

What is often left out is that the Westphalian system relied on recognition of mutual security concerns as a condition for reducing mutual threats as a way to advance indivisible security. The Peace of Westphalia therefore also introduced the foundations for modern diplomacy, which entails dialogue for mutual understanding as the condition for reducing the security competition.

Our politicians and media no longer do this. They do not recognise the security concerns of our opponents, which means that they can no longer reduce the security competition and pursue indivisible security. Those who attempt to understand the opposing side, to place themselves in the shoes of the opponent and have some empathy, are labelled as Putinists, Panda-huggers and apologists for the Ayatollahs. Recognising the security concerns of the opponent has become tantamount to “legitimising” or “supporting” the policies of the opponents, which is seen as an act of treason. The result is that it becomes impossible to pursue indivisible security and peace.

Prof. Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

The deeper the belief in the righteousness of the cause, the easier it becomes to love the war that serves it.

Norway identifies itself as a model of a liberal and tolerant peace-oriented nation. Yet, a collective mindset has developed with intense distrust and loathing of anyone who deviates from the government’s official truth and war narratives.

Here is a social experiment to test the claim above. I am a professor of political science, but I am also a politician running for Parliament. My recently established political party is primarily an anti-war party, and we started a poster campaign on public transportation in Oslo. The core message was that we are for negotiations and against weapons for the war in Ukraine. This seemed like a reasonable position as Norway previously had (until 2022) a policy of not sending weapons to countries at war (as it escalates and can make us a participant), and our country used to advocate for diplomacy and negotiations as the path to peace.

Norway has abandoned these policies and unified under the new mantra that “weapons are the path to peace”, and we have boycotted basic diplomacy with Russia for more than three years at a time when hundreds of thousands of young men died in the trenches. Was our peace-oriented nation ready to at least consider the argument that we should return to our former policies of negotiating instead of fueling the war with more weapons to fight the world’s largest nuclear power?

Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

Ideological fundamentalism refers to when ideology convinces the public that politics is a struggle between good and evil. People no longer assess states based on what they do in the international system but on the political identities assigned to them.

Kenneth Waltz, the godfather of neorealist theory, observed that Western democracies had a proclivity toward ideological fundamentalism. Waltz wrote:

💬 “Citizens of democratic states tend to think of their countries as good, aside from what they do, simply because they are democratic... democratic states also tend to think of undemocratic states as bad, aside from what they do, simply because they are undemocratic.”

Citizens of democracies also think of their countries as being more peaceful because they are democratic. Because it is believed that democracies are more peaceful and less likely to start wars, it has laid the foundation for “democratic wars” as invading non-democracies to make them democratic is believed to make the world more peaceful. Western democracies have subsequently committed themselves to perpetual war with the promise of delivering Kant’s perpetual peace.

Ideological fundamentalism is to some extent embedded in human nature as human beings are social animals that have organised in groups for tens of thousands of years for security and meaning. Human beings instinctively organise into the in-group (us) versus the diametrically opposite out-groups (them). The out-group as our opposite reaffirms our own identity – we can only identify as white if there is black, only west if there is east, only civilised if there are barbaric, only democratic if there are authoritarians, and only good if there is evil.

Reidar Kaarboe
Hva Mener Partiene

Dramatically different versions—The Russian version of the war in Ukraine dramatically differs from the version we are presented with in Norway. One of the versions is heavily tainted with lies, deception, and propaganda. The problem is which one. Because the Western version is well covered, this post will look at the issues as seen from the East. Such an angle is not only legitimate - it is necessary.

The West did not want to help Russia.—Resentment towards Russia is old. Several of the countries in the old Soviet Union experienced economic problems when the union was dissolved and the Berlin Wall fell. Jeffrey Sachs - a well-known American economist - led the work on economic reform in Poland in the 1990s with financial support from the US. Afterward, he was asked by Russia to assist them in the same process, but this time Washington clearly said NO, helping Russia was out of the question. He has since publicly criticized the US and the IMF for letting Russia collapse, saying: "Washington wanted Russia to go under. There was no interest in a prosperous, stable Russia. The goal was control."

Even then, Russia was an enemy, and the Cold War was still hanging on.—The result for Russia in the 1990s was a massive economic crisis, hyperinflation, and a collapse in living standards. A small group of oligarchs took control of large parts of the country's resources - often with Western assistance and corruption, and Russian fortunes were invested in the West. As Putin came to power and began to re-establish state control over the energy sector (such as Gazprom, Rosneft, etc.), he was increasingly seen as an obstacle to US-style "reforms".

Glenn Diesen
Glenn's Substack

Narratives have been constructed to support a long war in Ukraine. For example, the narrative of an “unprovoked invasion” was important to criminalise diplomacy as the premise suggests negotiations would reward Russian military adventurism and embolden further Russian aggression. Meanwhile, NATO escalating the war creates costs that outweigh the benefits to Russia.

Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum is a key narrative that supports a long war. It is constantly referenced as a reason why Russia cannot be trusted to abide by a peace agreement, and why the war must keep going. The argument is that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees for its territorial integrity. Russia’s breach of this agreement suggests it cannot be trusted and that the only reliable security guarantees must come from NATO membership. Furthermore, the West must continue to send weapons to Ukraine to honour the security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum.

In February 2022, a few days before the Russian invasion, Zelensky referred to the Budapest Memorandum: “Ukraine has received security guarantees for abandoning the world's third nuclear capability. We don't have that weapon. We also have no security.” The Budapest Memorandum was again used by Zelensky in October 2024 to support the argument that Ukraine must either have NATO or nukes: “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons, and then it will be a defence for us, or Ukraine will be in NATO”.

This article presents facts and arguments that challenge the false narrative of the Budapest Memorandum, which aims to delegitimise diplomacy. Criticising the narrative of the Budapest Memorandum does not entail “legitimising” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is a common tactic to smear and censor criticism against the narratives supporting a long war.