Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

As it’s always done, Russia is expected to ensure its sovereignty, security, and thus its survival through the creative interplay between its political, military, intelligence, diplomatic, expert, and civil society communities.

Russia’s special operation against NATO-backed Ukraine just entered its fifth year. The last three anniversaries were reflected upon here, and keeping with tradition, the present piece will review what happened over the past year and forecast what might be come in the next one.

Generally speaking, Russia now faces five geostrategic challenges that are expected to shape its approach towards the US-mediated peace talks with Ukraine and its grand strategy overall, namely:

❖ NATO Influence Is Poised To Expand Along Russia’s Entire Southern Periphery | Last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) along Armenia’s southern Syunik Province has the dual function of a NATO military-logistics corridor through the South Caucasus to Central Asia. Spearheaded by member state Turkiye with allied Azerbaijan serving as the launchpad across the Caspian, TRIPP threatens to revolutionize Russia’s regional security situation for the worse if these threats aren’t contained, especially if it emboldens Kazakhstan to follow in Ukraine’s footsteps.

❖ The US Supports The Revival Of Poland’s Long-Lost Great Power Status | “September 2025 Was The Most Eventful Month For Poland Since The End Of Communism” for the 18 reasons enumerated in the preceding hyperlinked analysis, which set Poland up to play a central role in the US’ National Security Strategy for containing Russia after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Continuing to falsely conflate Europe’s interests with Ukraine’s will only accelerate its growing irrelevance as the US exploits its misguided priorities to institutionalize the EU’s vassalage as a captive arms, energy, and export market.

The Guardian’s Timothy Garton Ash published an article in late May about “how to defeat Vladimir Putin”. The lede claimed that “The Russian dictator’s dreams of greatness threaten Nato and the EU, not just Ukraine.

Garton Ash then advised that there are eight ways in which Vladimir Putin can be thwarted”: “What democracies in Europe and beyond can do is hone a strategy to defeat his external ambitions.” He then detailed eight policies for them to apply, which will now be briefly critiqued:

1. Have A Clear Purpose | Garton Ash believes that the West must prevent Putin from “subjugating Ukraine, restoring as much as possible of the Russian empire, destroying the credibility of Nato, undermining the European Union and re-establishing a Russian sphere of influence over eastern Europe.” Putin’s goal has always been to neutralize Ukrainian-emanating threats from NATO in order to then reform the European security architecture after diplomacy failed to achieve this, however, so Garton Ash’s “clear purpose” is irrelevant.

2. Stay The Course With Ukraine | Garton Ash advises that the West continue its existing support for Ukraine even after the conflict ends in order to prevent it from becoming “a depopulated, internally conflicted, dysfunctional state.” The problem with this proposal is that it would entail over half a trillion dollars if the estimated physical reconstruction costs are borne by Ukraine’s patrons and even if more if they continue funding its armed forces and administration. Taxpayers across the West might not agree to foot such a tremendous bill.

3. Increase Economic Pressure On Russia | Apart from “tightening sanctions and supporting Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure”, Garton Ash calls for “cracking down harder on Russia’s shadow fleet.” For as appealing as that might sound to many hawks, there’s little left that the West could sanction, Russia’s further reduced energy production could spike global prices at Western consumers’ expense, and seizing naval-escorted “shadow fleet” vessels risks a hot NATO-Russian war. Western policymakers might thus reject his advice.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

One of the special operation’s goals is to neutralize these Ukrainian terrorist threats to civilians that Russia long foresaw but was unable to preemptively avert through diplomatic means.

Three waves of Ukrainian drones struck a dormitory in Starobelsk, a town in Russia’s formerly Ukrainian Lugansk Region, last week in an attack that killed nearly two dozen students. Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN brought it up at an emergency meeting only to be met with denials by Ukraine that any attack had even taken place despite indisputable evidence to the contrary. About that, the BBC and CNN rejected Russia’s invitation to visit the site, and EU leaders remain silent about the attack.

Whether Ukraine deliberately targeted the dormitory like Russia claims given its track record of terrorist attacks since the special operation began or it was a case of faulty intelligence like others have speculated, its official response at the UN is self-discrediting and should raise suspicions among all. Flat-out denying that any incident took place and instead describing claims thereof as “baseless”, even adding that they “belong to a textbook disinformation campaign from Moscow”, is over the top.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

It can simultaneously threaten Russia along the increasingly interconnected Arctic and Baltic fronts.

Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolai Korchunov gave a brief interview to TASS about bilateral relations. He warned that Norway is integrating new NATO members Sweden and https://korybko.substack.com/p/finland-is-on-track-to-become-one into the bloc’s regional plans. More American military bases and NATO facilities are opening up there too. To make matters worse, 32,500 troops from 14 NATO countries in last March’s “Cold Response” military drills in Norway and Finland’s northern regions, which add to growing NATO threats to Russia from this direction.

NATO’s militarization of the Arctic, which also includes artificially engineered tensions over the demilitarized Svalbard Archipelago, is proceeding in parallel with its militarization of the Baltic. Korchunov believes that this raises the risk of the bloc one day attempting to blockade Russia. He reassured his compatriots that the authorities will defend their country’s interests, however, including through military-technical means in an allusion to new naval escorts of some commercial vessels.

In connection with blockade scenarios, Korchunov was asked about TASS’ report from early April about how “Ukraine readies terrorist attacks on Russian ships off coast of Norway”, which he said caused quite a stir in his host country.

He didn’t elaborate on how exactly Russia plans to deter or defend against potential Ukrainian drone attacks from Norway, but he ominously warned that escalating threats to Russia from Norway “will inevitably lead to a directly proportional increase in risks for Norway itself.”

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Their newly agreed connectivity partnership gives the bloc tangible stakes in Pashinyan’s re-election and ensures that they’ll support whatever measures he resorts to for remaining in power.

Next month’s parliamentary elections in Armenia are shaping up to be a “Battle for Armenia” due to the geopolitical stakes at play. If pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party wins, then last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) will be built with gusto, thus risking Russia’s displacement from the region. That’s because TRIPP isn’t just a trade corridor, but also a NATO military logistics one to Central Asia, and it could be paired with the contentious Trans-Caspian Pipeline.

The injection of more Western economic and military influence along Russia’s southern periphery, including the political influence that comes with them, would amount to the accelerated implementation of Trump’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine for “rolling back” Russian influence there. The aforesaid scenario is dependent on TRIPP, particularly Russia’s inability to monitor shipments across this route to prevent it from turning into a military logistics corridor, which in turn depends on the outcome of June’s elections.

If the nationalist opposition wins, then they’ll likely restore Armenia’s compliance with the last part of November 2020’s Russian-mediated ceasefire regarding Moscow’s responsibility for securing this trade route, the role of which was replaced after TRIPP was agreed to. After all, allowing Armenia to facilitate the Azeri-Turkish Axis’ military logistical plans for Central Asia at NATO’s behest would risk turning their country into a “Neo-Ottoman sanjak”, the socio-cultural consequences of which were described here.

In short, the erasure of Armenia’s multimillennial-long culture might finally become a fait accompli if it’s coerced by Azerbaijan, the EU, and the US into accepting the return of the ~200,000 Azeris who fled during the chaotic Soviet collapse and the descendants as a precondition for regional peace.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Instead of waiting for Pashinyan to hold a referendum on joining the EU, which he might never end up doing in order to retain the advantages from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union for as long as possible, Putin might cut Armenia off right away if Pashinyan wins re-election by hook or by crook.

A journalist asked Putin over the weekend about his reaction to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hosting Zelensky last week and giving him a platform to threaten Russia. Putin dodged that part of the question but elaborated on the future of their ties. Russia wants only the best for Armenia and will respect its people’s wishes, he said, in connection with which he proposed that they hold a referendum on Pashinyan’s plans to join the EU since that policy risks ruining economic ties with Russia.

As a reminder, Putin said that a little less than one-quarter of Armenia’s GDP comes from trade with Russia, around $7 billion out of $29 billion last year. The advantages that it derives from membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union apply to “agriculture, the processing industry, customs and other duties, and so on and so forth. This also applies to migration.” If its people decide to end them, Putin said, then Russia will begin the process of “a gentle, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.”

Putin hosted Pashinyan for candid talks in early April that were assessed here as representing the moment of truth in their relations. The day after, “A Top Russian Official Rang The Alarm About Deteriorating Relations With Armenia”, specifically condemning last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) for upsetting the regional geostrategic balance. This was followed last week by the EU solidifying its influence in Armenia ahead of next month’s elections.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

There’s an unspoken rule that intel agencies aren’t supposed to implicitly threaten foreign diplomats’ children to coerce them into becoming informants.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova published an article in the Russian business daily Vedomosti on Monday about the curious case of a Russian diplomat in the US. An unknown employee of the State Department informed them during a call that their son, who was born in the US, “has been granted US citizenship without his consent by virtue of being born on American soil…Be on notice that your child is our citizen with all the ensuing consequences, and you cannot renounce this!”

Zakharova reminded readers that the children of foreign diplomats don’t have birthright citizenship privileges in the US. She then drew attention to how this incident contradicts Trump 2.0’s immigration policy, speculating that the Democrats are once again trying to subvert it for Russophobic reasons. She also expressed concern that “The arbitrary granting of US citizenship to such children potentially provides Washington with a lever for improper pressure on our personnel”. That’s likely the main motive.

As far as is publicly known, the incident that Zakharova described only happened with one Russian diplomat thus far, but it’s reasonable that she’s worried that “The deep state in the United States has created a new problem to exert pressure on Russian diplomats…Now the State Department – or those behind the façade of American diplomacy – have begun to extend US citizenship to children of Russian consular staff born under American jurisdiction”. This could indeed become a trend if it’s not stopped.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

The DROP Act Is An Unprecedented Weapon Of Financial Warfare Against Russia. Russia’s oil clients would be coerced under pain of sanctions into dumping it or scaling support for Ukraine if this bill passes.

Anti-Russian hawk Michael McCaul, who importantly serves as the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, announced the introduction in the House in early February of the bipartisan “Decreasing Russian Oil Profits” (DROP) Act that was earlier introduced in the Senate last December. If it passes, then Trump would have the power to impose targeted sanctions against anyone buying, importing, or facilitating the export of Russian oil, with exceptions only possible under one of three conditions.

The first is that the funds owed to Russia for such purchases must be credited to an account in their country, can only be used “to facilitate transactions in agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices”, and their government must commit to significantly reduce its purchase of Russian oil. The second is that such funds are used to either arm or rebuild Ukraine, while the third is that the government of their country provides significant economic or military support to Ukraine.

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

The “EU Defense Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defense Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki inaugurated the latest section of the “Via Baltica” highway between Poland and the Baltic States in late October in an event with his Lithuanian counterpart, with both highlighting the dual military purpose of this megaproject in an allusion to the “military Schengen”. “Via Baltica” is one of the “Three Seas Initiative’s” (3SI) flagships, many of which complement the newer “military Schengen” initiative of facilitating the flow of troops and equipment eastward towards Russia.

Poland envisages the 3SI accelerating the revival of its long-lost Great Power status that’ll then result in it leading Russia’s containment all across Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) once the Ukrainian Conflict ends. It’s the most populous formerly communist member of NATO with the bloc’s third-largest military, just became a $1 trillion economy with its sights now set on a G20 seat, and has a history of regional leadership during the Commonwealth/“Rzeczpospolita” era, so these ambitions aren’t delusional.

Building upon the last point, most casual observers don’t know that the Commonwealth stretched as far north as parts of Latvia, which remained under its control till the Third Partition in 1795. Prior to that, it even controlled around half of Estonia from 1561-1629, after which it was ceded to Sweden. Suffice to say, what’s nowadays the nation-state of Lithuania was also part of the “Republic of the Two Nations” as the Commonwealth was officially known, thus giving Poland a substantial footprint in Baltic history.

The insight shared in the preceding two paragraphs enables the reader to better understand what Nawrocki told Lithuanian media during his maiden trip as president to that country last September about how

Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

This might be the US’ final warning before it takes drastic action to punish those who continue to reject Trump’s demands.

Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby gave an important speech at mid-April’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group in which he urged the Europeans to step up their transition to something that he described earlier this year as “NATO 3.0”. As was explained here, “The idea is that NATO should return to focusing on defending itself instead of overextending itself in the Indo-Pacific, West Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere”, and the preceding hyperlinked analysis explains how it aligns with Trump 2.0’s policies.

Circling back to Colby’s speech, he demanded that “Europe must accelerate its assumption of primary responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent”, including arming Ukraine through the “Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List” (PURL) program in which the US plays the most significant role. To that end, “The need to quickly rebuild European munitions stocks is paramount, as is the need to remove protectionist trade barriers that stifle the continent’s industrial potential.”

He added that “Developing a robust, capable, and integrated European defense industrial base cannot simply be an aspiration, but an absolute pre-requisite for credible deterrence and defense.” Knowing how obsessed they are with Ukraine, Colby then threw in that “This will be critical to achieving an end to the war in Ukraine, on terms that support an enduring peace.” He then called for more “deeds and a fundamental change in attitude” from them to “accelerate this transition to a ‘NATO 3.0’”.